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THE END OF CORPORATE LAW 
Dalia Tsuk Mitchell*
INTRODUCTION 
Corporations are powerful entities, capable of harming the 
environment and modern society more broadly.  Yet, as I argue in 
this Article, during the twentieth century the legal community has 
made corporate law, specifically the rules applicable to the 
allocation of power among directors, executives, and shareholders, 
ineffective as a means of regulating corporate power.1  Put more 
bluntly, I argue that in the course of the past century corporate law 
has been used first to legitimate corporate power and then to 
exempt those exercising it from liability.  Making corporations 
responsible for harmful conduct thus requires, first and foremost, 
putting an end to corporate law.2
The first part of this Article focuses on the early-twentieth 
century concerns about the growth of the publicly held corporation 
and the Progressives’ response to it.  I argue that reformers’ 
dominant frame of reference during this era was the increasing 
power of the large public corporation.  Amidst debates about the 
possibilities of effective federal or state regulation, corporate law 
scholars focused on the power that the control group (typically 
controlling shareholders and investment bankers) could exercise to 
manipulate stock prices and market transactions.  Seeking to 
* © 2009 Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Professor of Law and History, The George
Washington University.  I am grateful to Alan Palmiter for organizing this 
symposium and for inviting me to participate and to Lawrence Mitchell and 
Arthur Wilmarth for comments on earlier drafts.  The George Washington 
University Summer Research Fund provided financial support.  This Article 
draws on my previous scholarship on the development of corporate law.  See 
generally Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Status Bound: The Twentieth Century Evolution 
of Directors’ Liability, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 63 (2009); Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, 
Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1503 (2006); Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle 
and Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
179 (2005); Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive 
Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861 (2003). 
1. The Article does not examine the role of other corporate constituencies
(for example, workers) because they remain outside the realm of state corporate 
law. 
2. While the second part of this Article examines the shareholder proposal
rule, enacted under the Securities Act of 1934, this Article does not make any 
claims with respect to the general effectiveness of securities regulation. 
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legitimate the public corporation and its power while eliminating 
such abuses by the control group, scholars turned their attention to 
corporate directors.  After tinkering with ideas such as corporate 
self-government and shareholder organization, they settled on 
fiduciary duties as a means of taming corporate power.  They put 
concerns about corporate power to rest by vesting corporate 
directors with public power and public trust (to be enforced by the 
courts).  This understanding underlay many early New Deal 
programs. 
As I argue in the second part of this Article, after the programs 
of the New Deal were put in place and the Great Depression wore 
down, concerns about corporate power indeed dissipated.  Instead, 
reformers focused their attention on corporate internal hierarchies.  
As share ownership became more widely dispersed and professional 
management replaced bankers and controlling shareholders as the 
control group, corporate law scholars and reformers focused upon 
the relationship between management and individual shareholders.  
For one thing, in the early 1940s, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) adopted Rule 14a-8 to give shareholders the 
participatory role state law effectively denied them in managing the 
affairs of their corporations.  It required the board to include certain 
shareholder proposals in its annual proxy solicitation.  By protecting 
the rights of individual shareholders to participate in their 
corporation’s annual meetings, the New Deal reformers and their 
successors hoped not only to constrain corporate management but 
also to legitimate its power to run the corporation.  More broadly, 
they hoped to legitimate a democratic regime founded on 
professional management of collective property.  Court cases 
embracing the description of directors as Platonic masters 
substantiated this idea in ways that, ironically, eclipsed any notion 
of shareholder participation. 
Beginning in the 1960s, the focal point for analysis shifted to 
the market.  As I explain in the third part of this Article, 
mainstream legal scholars and economists came to believe that the 
market was the most effective institution to constrain corporate 
activities.  In addition to the fears of corporate power, which faded 
after influencing the early-twentieth century debates, the concerns 
about corporate hierarchies that dominated the mid-century 
discussions disappeared.  Just as insider professional management 
became more powerful and the board of directors became ever less 
involved in managing the affairs of the corporation, scholars 
described directors as the (private) agents of the shareholders and 
emphasized the ability of individual shareholders freely to elect 
them (albeit in a corporate world dominated by institutional 
investors).  Endorsing a strong separation between the roles of 
public shareholders and those in control, proponents of this vision 
argued that dissatisfied shareholders should use their voting power 
or sell their stock.  The directors (and executives) were seen as the 
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shareholders’ agents but left to act with no constraints or liabilities. 
I.  POWER 
The turn of the twentieth century witnessed a dramatic growth 
in the scale of private business organizations.  Increasing consumer 
demand, rising numbers of skilled and unskilled workers, and an 
expanding pool of capital made the creation of large enterprises 
possible, while corporate lawyers created a variety of legal devices to 
help their clients increase the scope of their operations.  Trusts, 
holding companies, and mergers became common, even if often 
contested in state courts.3  The nineteenth-century corporation, 
which was subject to strict constraints on its powers and limitations 
on its capital structure, was replaced by larger and larger units.  
Between 1888 and 1893, New Jersey revised its general 
incorporation statute to eliminate restrictions on “capitalization and 
assets, mergers and consolidations, the issuance of voting stock, the 
purpose(s) of incorporation, and the duration and locale of 
business.”4  Other states followed suit, enacting more enabling 
incorporation statutes (including Delaware, which by the second 
decade of the twentieth century would become the revolution’s 
leader).5  And corporations were quick to use the powers that these 
enabling statutes granted them.6
The concentration of power in the trusts and large business 
corporations undermined nineteenth-century democratic ideals.  
Progressives feared that corporations were wearing away the 
function of the individual producer and, with it, nineteenth-century 
democratic and economic ideals.  These ideals were the power of 
markets equally to “distribute the rewards of individual industry” 
and to help “conform individual liberty” to socially beneficial ends.7  
For some scholars, individual ownership of property and 
participation in the market economy were a means of cultivating 
social and political citizenship.  They saw in the corporation’s 
collective ownership a threat to the idea of “ordinary ‘producers’” 
who “shape their world on equal footing.”8  For others, private 
 3. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 80–90 (1992) (examining these 
transformations). 
 4. SCOTT R. BOWMAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT: LAW, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY 60 (1996); see also ROLAND MARCHAND, 
CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AND CORPORATE 
IMAGERY IN AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS 7 (1998) (noting the proliferation of 
corporate mergers between 1895 and 1904). 
 5. See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 4, at 60. 
 6. Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in the Progressive 
Era, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 160, 161 (1982). 
 7. L.S. Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way: The Decline of 
Developmental Property, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 596, 618 (1988). 
 8. Id. at 619. 
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property was a means of constraining the exercise of public power.  
They saw in the concentration of power in a few corporations a 
threat to individual autonomy.9
Seeking to sustain the nineteenth-century ideals of civic 
engagement in the twentieth-century organizational society and to 
add organization, stability, and reason to what seemed to be the 
chaotic nature of industrial capitalism, Progressives focused their 
attention on the growing trusts.  Some reformers viewed large 
business units (and an economy of scale) as inevitable and sought to 
subject them to national control.  Others emphasized the need to 
control business units locally in order to encourage civic 
participation and constrain corporate power.  While endorsing two 
presumably opposing positions—centralization and decentralization 
of power, respectively—Progressive reformers seemed to converge on 
mandatory disclosure as the ultimate means of regulating corporate 
power.10
The ideal of disclosure immensely influenced President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s approach to federal regulation.  While his 
advisers urged Roosevelt to create a federal body with powers to 
plan, stimulate, and stabilize economic activity, or even to consider a 
federal incorporation act, Roosevelt believed that when bankers’ 
activities were exposed to public scrutiny, self-interest would be 
curbed.11  Accordingly, the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 were not 
predicated upon the need for government planning but on the ideal 
of consumerism.  They rested on the assumption that as long as 
individual shareholders were fully informed about the product, they 
would be able to make intelligent decisions about their securities 
purchases.  Moreover, proponents of both Acts believed that as long 
as individual shareholders had access to internal corporate 
information, they would help free the market from fraud and 
manipulation.12  The government could ensure “full and fair 
disclosure of the nature of the security being offered” but could not 
 9. Id.  For a detailed analysis of these concerns and their impact on 
Progressive thought, see LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: 
HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY 90–112 (2007). 
 10. Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of 
Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503. 1516–19 (2006).  On the 
positions of centralization and decentralization, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, 
DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 211–21 
(1996).  On Progressive ideology more broadly, see, for example, RICHARD H. 
PELLS, RADICAL VISIONS AND AMERICAN DREAMS: CULTURE AND SOCIAL THOUGHT 
IN THE DEPRESSION YEARS (1998). 
 11. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY 
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 
40–42 (1982).  On the renewed interest in federal incorporation during the early 
New Deal, see generally Philip A. Loomis, Jr. & Beverly K. Rubman, Corporate 
Governance in Historical Perspective, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141 (1980). 
 12. SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 39–63. 
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“pass upon the investment quality of the security.”13
Despite their limited scope, the business community did not 
welcome the 1933 and 1934 Acts.  Of particular concern were the 
1933 Act’s liability clauses, which imposed civil liability on 
corporations and their officers for fraud and for misstatements in 
the registration statement, and the 1934 Act’s limitations on the 
exchanges’ powers.14  Those advocating broader corporate reform 
were also not satisfied.  In an article published several months after 
the 1933 Act was passed, Adolf A. Berle, Jr. cautioned that, while 
the Act sought to eliminate financial fraud, it did not resolve the 
crucial “problem of power arising from financial control exercised by 
investment bankers.”15
Recognizing the limits of the new federal securities regulation, 
Progressive corporate law scholars like Berle wanted to use 
corporate law to constrain the power of the control group 
(investment bankers and controlling shareholders).  These scholars 
described corporations as sovereign (or semi-sovereign) entities, 
accepted them as such, and aimed to rein in those who controlled 
them by arguing that corporate power should be exercised to benefit 
the community at large.  The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, which Berle coauthored with Gardiner C. Means, best 
articulated this argument.16  While in the collective imagination of 
corporate law scholars the book is remembered for its exegesis of the 
separation of ownership from control in large public corporations, 
Berle and Means’s interests focused on corporate power. 
Berle and Means wrote that the separation of ownership from 
control allowed tremendous buildups of power and that, given 
corporations’ economic power, it was meaningless to assume that 
corporations were private associations or that the state was the only 
center of coercive (public) power.17  Corporate power, they explained, 
was “comparable to the concentration of religious power in the 
mediaeval church or of political power in the national state.”18  The 
modern corporation’s political and economic powers were equivalent 
to the powers of the state.19
 13. Id. at 63 (quoting James Landis’s recollection of the drafting of the 
Securities Act of 1933). 
 14. RALPH F. DE BEDTS, THE NEW DEAL’S SEC: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 49-50 
(1964). 
 15. Id. at 51 (citing A.A. Berle, Jr., High Finance: Master or Servant, 23 
YALE REV. 20, 40–42 (1933)). 
 16. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 352–57 (1932). 
 17. Id. at 352–53. 
 18. Id. at 352. 
 19. For a detailed description of Berle and Means’s ideas, see Dalia Tsuk, 
Corporations without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 1861 (2003) [hereinafter Tsuk, Corporations without Labor]; 
Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-
Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179 (2005) 
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Having called attention to corporate power, as augmented by 
the separation of ownership from control, Berle and Means rejected 
the traditional common law rules of property and contract as means 
of restraining corporate power.  They argued that the application of 
strict property rules to passive ownership would require the control 
group to exercise corporate power for the benefit of the shareholder 
and put “the bulk of American industry” in the service of “inactive 
and irresponsible security owners.”20  In turn, strict contractual 
rules would have vested the control group with uncurbed power.  
Instead, Berle and Means proclaimed that “by surrendering control 
and responsibility over the active property,” shareholders had 
released the community from the obligation fully to protect their 
property rights and cleared the way for placing “the community in a 
position to demand that the modern corporation serve not [only] the 
owners or the control [group] but all society.”21  Corporate power was 
power in trust for the community. 
Because they feared potential abuses of corporate power, Berle 
and Means rejected the idea of freeing corporations to act as if they 
were mere aggregates of individuals or natural entities distinct from 
their individual members.22  Because they celebrated the 
contributions of corporate power to modern industrial society, Berle 
and Means also feared that an overuse of government regulation 
could eliminate the potential benefits of corporate power.  They 
rejected both the early-twentieth century idea of self-governing 
associations and the alternative of allowing the state to regulate all 
corporate activities.  Instead, Berle and Means wanted to subject 
large economic organizations to limits associated with checks on 
government power, specifically the requirement that corporations 
act to benefit the community.23
While the Securities Acts focused mostly on disclosure as a 
[hereinafter Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism].  For a different 
interpretation of Berle’s and his contemporaries’ ideas, see William W. Bratton 
& Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle 
and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008). 
 20. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 16, at 354. 
 21. Id. at 354–56. 
 22. On the natural entity theory and other visions of the corporation, see 
HORWITZ, supra note 3, at 100–05; Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The 
Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1441 (1987); Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of 
Organizational “Real Entity” Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575 (1989); David 
Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201; Tsuk, Corporations 
Without Labor, supra note 19, at 1870–75. 
 23. Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism, supra note 19, at 195–96.  
Berle, Means, and their colleagues also believed that the courts could enforce 
these trust obligations.  But the idea of imposing a unified conception of social 
trusteeship on directors (and corporations) became less feasible after the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) 
put an end to the idea of federal common law.  Id. at 204. 
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solution to the problems of corporate America, Berle and Means’s 
conception of the corporation substantiated the early New Deal 
efforts to bring relief and recovery through government planning 
and coordination.24  As Louis Jaffe put it, the different New Deal 
programs were grounded in the realization that “the most 
significant and powerful components of the social structure [were] 
economic groups, competing and complementary in varying 
degrees.”25  These programs’ goal, as Means described it, was not to 
“make the market effective as a coordinator,” which would have 
required “revers[ing] the trend of a century and break[ing] the large 
units into a multitude of smaller enterprises.”26  Rather, the thrust 
of the early New Deal was to keep the large units and increase “the 
element of administrative coordination of economic activity rather 
than its elimination.”27
Still, as far as state corporate law goes, the idea that corporate 
power was power in trust for the community was insufficient as a 
regulatory tool, a fact that did not escape its main proponents.  
Fearing that such an abstraction could even help legitimate abuses 
of corporate power, Berle tried to make the idea of trusteeship 
concrete.  In Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, an article he 
published in 1931, “[d]uring the penultimate stage of The Modern 
Corporation’s creation,”28 Berle assigned corporate directors the task 
of guaranteeing the appropriate exercise of corporate power.29  
Ironically, viewing directors as trustees helped ameliorate concerns 
about corporate power and thus legitimate it. 
Berle’s Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust was an argument 
designed to eliminate the potential for managerial abuse of its 
market powers.  Berle wanted to protect those who were not in 
control of the corporate machinery from fraud and manipulative 
practices that were extremely harmful toward minority 
shareholders and that, in the early twentieth century, plagued the 
securities markets.30  To that end, Berle surveyed corporate law 
 24. Joseph L. Weiner, The New Deal and the Corporation, 19 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 724, 724–25 (1952). 
 25. Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 
201 (1937). 
 26. Gardiner C. Means, The Distribution of Control and Responsibility in a 
Modern Economy, 50 POL. SCI. Q. 59, 63 (1935). 
 27. Id. 
 28. JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN 
AMERICAN ERA 64 (1987). 
 29. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. 
L. REV. 1049 (1931). 
 30. At the turn of the twentieth century, investment bankers became 
promoters and directors of corporations and were able, through their economic 
power and the use of legal devices such as voting trusts and non-voting stock, to 
control even those boards on which they did not sit.  As Berle wrote in 1926, 
because management stock would likely be controlled by the investment 
banking house that served as a promoter for the corporation, “it [was] possible, 
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doctrine with respect to a variety of managerial powers.  He 
concluded, descriptively as well as normatively, that new stock 
issuance was allowed only when “the ratable interest of existing and 
prospective shareholders” was protected,31 that dividends 
distribution had to benefit all shareholders,32 that acquisition of 
stock in other corporations could not be used “to forward the 
enterprises of the managers as individuals or to subserve special 
interests within or without the corporation,”33 that charter 
amendments had “to benefit the corporation as a whole, 
and . . . distribute equitably the benefit or the sacrifice . . . between 
all groups in the corporation as their interests may appear,”34 and 
that the interests of all classes of shares had to be “respectively 
recognized and substantially protected” in merger and acquisition 
transactions.35  To ensure that these goals were fulfilled, Berle 
wanted to make the powers to issue stock, to declare or withhold 
dividends, to acquire stock in other corporations, to amend the 
corporation’s charter, and “to transfer the corporate enterprise to 
another enterprise by merger, exchange of stock, sale of assets or 
otherwise”36—each power previously considered a matter of contract 
law37—a matter of directors’ trusteeship duties. 
if not probable, that there [would] be attractive opportunities for manipulation 
of securities, for negotiating favorable contracts with allied interests, or even for 
giving value to stock which represent[ed] no real investment.”  Adolf A. Berle, 
Jr., Non-Voting Stock and “Bankers’ Control,” 39 HARV. L. REV. 673, 676 (1926).  
Given the “web of economic interests” which the investment banking house 
served and from which it made its profits, it was likely that management stock 
would be voted for transactions that benefited the investment banking house, or 
even the controlling groups, but not the controlled corporation.  Id.  William O. 
Douglas, sharing Berle’s views, labeled the interests of investment banking 
houses “high finance,” charging that they were “interested solely in the 
immediate profit.”  William O. Douglas, The Forces of Disorder, Address at the 
University of Chicago (Oct. 27, 1936) with additions from addresses at the 
Economic Club of Chicago (Feb. 1, 1938) and the Bond Club of New York (Mar. 
24, 1937), in DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: THE ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS 
OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 9 (James Allen ed., 1940).  According to Douglas, the 
interests of high finance were different from those of small individual 
shareholders or even the corporation, but with the power of control, high 
finance was able to profit by siphoning money from other investors.  Id.  On the 
role of investment banking in the early decades of the twentieth century, see 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 1–27 
(1914); Gardiner C. Means, The Separation of Ownership and Control in 
American Industry, 46 Q. J. ECON. 68, 72–74 (1932); Miguel Cantillo Simon, The 
Rise and Fall of Bank Control in the United States: 1890–1939, 88 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1077 (1998). 
 31. Berle, supra note 29, at 1050.  See generally id. at 1050–60. 
 32. Id. at 1060–63. 
 33. Id. at 1063.  See generally id. at 1063–66.  
 34. Id. at 1066.  See generally id. at 1066–69. 
 35. Id. at 1069.  See generally id. at 1069–72. 
 36. Id. at 1069. 
 37. Rudolph E. Uhlman, The Legal Status of Corporate Directors, 19 B.U. L. 
REV. 12, 18 (1939). 
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For contemporary scholars, describing corporate directors as 
trustees for the shareholders, as Berle did in Corporate Powers as 
Powers in Trust, seems to be in direct contradiction to describing 
them as trustees for the community, as Berle and Means suggested 
in The Modern Corporation and Private Property.  For Berle the two 
positions were complementary.  In a follow-up article, he explained 
that those in control did not see themselves as fiduciaries.38  Any 
weakening of their obligations toward the shareholders would thus 
make their power absolute.  As Berle pointedly put it, “you can not 
abandon emphasis on ‘the view that business corporations exist for 
the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders’ until such 
time as you are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable 
scheme of responsibilities to someone else.”39
Berle’s Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust was one of the first 
attempts to define a role for the board as distinguished from 
managers.  Berle wanted the board to mediate the conflicting 
interests of those in control of the enterprise and the individual 
shareholders subject to their powers.  A few years later, William O. 
Douglas offered a similar and more elaborate discussion of the 
function of the board.40
Douglas’s Directors Who Do Not Direct was published in 1934, 
shortly after the enactment of the Securities Acts and three years 
before Douglas was to become Chairman of the SEC.41  It began by 
reiterating the “many different abuses and malpractices” of the 
1920s: 
secret loans to officers and directors, undisclosed profit-
sharing plans, timely contracts unduly favorable to affiliated 
interests, dividend policies based on false estimates, 
manipulations of credit resources and capital structures to the 
detriment of minority interests, poor operations, and trading 
in securities of the company by virtue of inside information, to 
mention only a few.42
As Douglas saw it, all of these abuses indicated that businessmen 
had lost sight of their public role.43
Douglas believed that the newly enacted Securities Acts offered 
some protection to shareholders by requiring accurate disclosure in 
 38. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 
45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Cf. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards, in THE NEW 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Troy A. Paredes ed., forthcoming 2009) (examining 
the development of the modern monitoring board), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=801308. 
 41. William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 
1305 (1934). 
 42. Id. at 1306. 
 43. Id. 
 712 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
 
the proxy solicitation process but he did not think such disclosure 
was sufficient.44  Seeking to encourage “the development of a social 
mindedness . . . among business men and their legal advisers,”45 
Douglas’s attention focused on corporate law.  He wanted to make 
the board independent of management.  While Berle’s analysis 
focused on the power of the control group to manipulate the market, 
Douglas’s main concern was management’s control of the board, 
which, he believed, was at the root of the problems of the 1920s.46
According to Douglas, the purpose of the board of directors was 
to protect shareholders from management.47  To achieve this goal, 
directors had to be independent of management—they could not be 
“called in by the managers,” drawn from the managers, or be 
subordinate to the managers in any way.48  In fact, Douglas believed 
that the independent directors should be elected from among the 
shareholders.49  Furthermore, the independent directors were to 
have a role distinct from the executives’ role.  While the executives 
were to manage the corporation, the independent board of directors 
was assigned the task of setting the corporation’s policies and 
agenda and monitoring the executives lest they abuse their 
managerial power to benefit themselves or the control group.50  As 
Douglas put it, independent directors, “[t]he representatives of the 
stockholders[,] would be there, not for the purpose of managing the 
enterprise, but with the object of supervising those who do and of 
formulating the general commercial and financial policies under 
which the business is to be conducted.”51
In an address delivered five years after the publication of 
Directors Who Do Not Direct, Douglas went even further, suggesting 
that outside, independent directors should be “paid for their work in 
proportion to the actual contributions made by them.”52  Pay, he 
suggested, would go a long way toward the creation of a professional 
director.53  It would allow outside, independent directors to protect 
the interests of the small stockholder as well as the community. 
“Since the beginning of corporate history—and particularly since 
corporations began to turn to the public for their funds,” Douglas 
explained, “it has been recognized that the interests of the 
stockholders could not be adequately served by management 
alone. . . .  The check of a board of vigilant, well-informed directors 
 44. Id. at 1323–25. 
 45. Id. at 1307. 
 46. Mitchell, supra note 40, at 17. 
 47. Douglas, supra note 41, at 1307. 
 48. Id. at 1313. 
 49. Id. at 1314–15. 
 50. Id. at 1314. 
 51. Id. 
 52. William O. Douglas, Corporation Directors, Address at Fort Worth, Tex. 
(Jan. 8, 1939), in DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE, supra note 30, at 47. 
 53. Id. at 52–53. 
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is needed to assure that management is always loyal, honest, and 
prudent.”54
Lest he be misunderstood, Douglas emphasized that corporate 
powers were powers in trust.  As he put it, “directors are trustees by 
virtue of business ethics as well as law; and . . . the powers which 
they exercise are powers in trust.”55  “[T]he paid director,” he 
similarly pointed out in 1939, “would revive and strengthen the 
tradition of trusteeship. . . .  In a larger sense, he would not be so 
much a paid director or a professional director as a public director, 
representing not only the present but the potential stockholder, and 
representing the general public as well.”56
In short, while Douglas’s focus was not corporate power but 
corporate internal hierarchies, he, like Berle, saw no contradiction 
between the directors’ role as trustees for the community and their 
role as the shareholders’ representatives.  Douglas and Berle 
wanted to constrain those in control, whether investment bankers, 
minority owners, or management.  Demanding corporations to act as 
trustees for the community and directors to represent the interests 
of the shareholders were thus complementary requirements.57
Berle’s and Douglas’s arguments did not stimulate a continuing 
scholarly debate about the role of the board of directors, but they 
helped alleviate concerns about corporate power.  By the late 1930s, 
many believed that the policies of the New Deal sufficiently 
circumscribed the corporation’s powers.  The Securities Acts 
regulated the corporation’s dealings with its shareholders as well as 
its creditors, new federal labor laws regulated the corporation’s 
relations with its employees, and antitrust laws affected the 
corporation’s behavior toward consumers and suppliers.58  Even as 
corporations continued to gain tremendous power, concerns about 
the corporation’s external powers rapidly dissipated.  Instead, and 
seemingly following Berle’s and Douglas’s discussions of the 
relationship among directors, managers, and shareholders, scholars 
turned their attention to corporate internal hierarchies.  Amidst 
fears about the possibility that European totalitarianism would 
 54. Id. at 50. 
 55. Douglas, supra note 41, at 1322. 
 56. Douglas, supra note 52, at 53. 
 57. Indeed, Douglas wanted to see the development of a professional 
managerial class, “skilled in the technique of business, the art of law, and the 
skill of government,” that could monitor corporations so as to align the interests 
of the shareholders with the interests of the public—“so that the profit motive 
will be articulated with the public good” and investors guaranteed “more 
protection against the malpractices of management.”  Douglas, supra note 41, at 
1328. 
 58. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal 
Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1688 (1988); see also E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., The 
Modern Corporation, Private Property, and Recent Federal Legislation, 54 HARV. 
L. REV. 917 (1941) (discussing the impact of the New Deal legislation on the 
relationship between management and security holders). 
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reach American shores, reformers turned corporations into bearers 
of the American democratic ideal.  The SEC engaged in an overhaul 
of the proxy rules, presumably to give shareholders a more active 
voice in managing the affairs of their corporations, while legal 
scholars focused on the board’s control of the proxy machinery and 
its fiduciary duties.  Using democracy as a foundational concept, 
they ended up empowering the executives to run the corporation 
without constraints from either the directors or the shareholders.  
As the second part of this Article elaborates, just as the idea that 
corporate power was power in trust helped legitimate the large 
public corporation, the ideal of corporate democracy became an 
apology for executive power. 
II.  HIERARCHIES 
The business community’s relationship with the SEC is a good 
litmus test of the legitimacy of the public corporation and its power.  
The main actors in the SEC during the early 1930s believed that its 
role was to promote capitalism.59  They thought government 
planning was required to guarantee the financial stability that was 
necessary to sustain capitalism.  They presumed that the SEC 
would both “encourage rational organization within private groups 
and between private groups in order to achieve that stability,” and 
eliminate those market practices that threatened it.60  In short, the 
SEC “was both policeman and promoter; a vehicle for reform and a 
shield against more violent change.”61
As already noted, the business community was initially troubled 
by the liability clauses of the 1933 Act.62  But by the early 1940s it, 
too, came to believe that “the law, effectively enforced, assisted 
financial operations by policing marginal elements within the 
industry and by promoting minimum standards of disclosure.”63  
Gradually, it became apparent that the SEC was not against 
corporations “or the profit motive.”64  In fact, it seemed that the 
commissioners and staff members saw “the SEC as an extension of 
business enterprise.”65  Corporate power was not (or no longer) their 
concern. 
It was in this atmosphere that scholarly attention turned to the 
corporation’s internal structure.  In a world committed to the 
protection of business, scholars focused on the role of the individual 
 59. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 179 
(1970). 
 60. Id. at 180. 
 61. Id. 
 62. DE BEDTS, supra note 14, at 50; see also discussion supra text 
accompanying notes 14–15. 
 63. PARRISH, supra note 59, at 229. 
 64. Id. at 231. 
 65. Id.  
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shareholder in the large public corporation and the duties that 
directors owed to her.66  In the early 1940s such interest led the 
SEC’s Office of General Counsel to undertake a study of the proxy 
regulations.67  In 1942, following this study, the SEC suggested a 
number of changes, including the shareholder proposal rule.68  
Requiring the board of directors to include certain proposals from 
shareholders in its annual proxy solicitation, the rule was meant to 
encourage shareholder participation in corporate affairs (or 
shareholder democracy).  As Milton Freeman, the draftsman of the 
rule, explained a decade later, the SEC envisioned as the principal 
beneficiary of the rule the small shareholder who treated her 
investment as a long-term investment.69  SEC Chairman Ganson 
Purcell and his colleagues wanted to protect the individual 
shareholder against the corporation’s management.70  The directors, 
viewed as the shareholders’ representatives (or fiduciaries), were 
entrusted with the task of mediating potential conflicts between 
management and shareholders.71
Business groups were opposed to the shareholder proposal rule 
and any other form of “further legitimizing shareholder activism.”72  
In various disparaging comments about the knowledge, intentions, 
and ability of small shareholders, business groups proclaimed that 
the rule would “allow ‘crack-pots’ to make virtually meaningless 
 66. This shift in scholarly attention was substantiated in part by the 
assumption that the number of individual shareholders was rapidly growing.  
In 1934, the House Report on the Securities Exchange bill estimated that more 
than ten million individuals owned stocks or bonds, and that “over one fifth of 
all the corporate stock outstanding in the country [was] held by individuals 
with net incomes of less than $5,000 [$79,369.03 in 2009 dollars] a year.”  H.R. 
REP. NO. 73-1383, at 3–4 (1934).  In addition, the House Report noted that more 
than fifteen million individuals held insurance policies, more than thirteen 
million had “savings accounts in mutual savings banks,” and at least twenty-
five million had “deposits in national and State banks and trust companies—
which [were] in turn large holders of corporate stocks and bonds.”  Id.  Whether 
or not these estimates were accurate, they supported reformers’ growing 
interest in the role that individual shareholders could play in their 
corporations. 
 67. Philip A. Nicholas, Jr., The Securities and Exchange Commission and 
the Shareholder Proposal Rule: Agency Administration, Corporate Influence, 
and Shareholder Power, 1942–1988, at 111 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, State University of New York at Albany) (on file with author). 
 68. Id. at 111–12. 
 69. Milton V. Freeman, An Estimate of the Practical Consequences of the 
Shareholder’s Proposal Rule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 549, 552 (1957). 
 70. Securit[ies] and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules: Hearings on H.R. 
1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 78th Cong. 183 (1943) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Ganson 
Purcell, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 71. For a detailed discussion of the SEC’s promulgation of Rule 14a-8, see 
Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1547–53. 
 72. Nicholas, supra note 67, at 129. 
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statements”;73 that it “would put ‘dangerous weapons in the hands of 
the professional troublemaker’”;74 that it “would open the door wide 
to libelous, malicious, scurrilous, or abusive matter supplied by 
notoriety-seeking persons who need buy only a single share of stock 
for the purpose”;75 and that it would increase the length of the proxy 
statement, burden corporations with increased cost (at a time of 
war), and burden shareholders with too much information.76  Some 
went as far as to argue that “shareholder participation was not 
really necessary at all.”77
Those businesses and business groups who were willing to 
support the rule wanted to limit the scope of shareholder 
participation.  They suggested imposing restrictions that would 
permit only shareholders who owned a certain amount of stock to 
include their proposals and limit the number of proposals that any 
shareholder could submit.78  They further suggested that 
shareholder proposals be limited to “proper subjects for shareholder 
action under state law, and not address the ordinary business 
activities under the purview of management.”79  The final rule, 
reflecting the New Dealers’ own ambivalence about shareholder 
democracy, endorsed the suggested limitation.  It required 
management to include shareholder proposals in its proxy 
solicitation only when these proposals were “proper subjects for 
action by the security holders.”80
While the SEC was willing to limit the application of the rule, it 
was not willing to omit it.  Proclaiming that it did not see how 
shareholder proposals would burden corporations (even in times of 
war), the SEC included the rule in its December 1942 release.81  
Chairman Purcell and his team were keen on expanding the rights 
of shareholders, especially the small individual shareholder or, as 
they described her, the owner.  Purcell explained that: 
The rules are based on the fact that stockholders are the 
owners of their corporations and the stockholders’ meetings 
are their meetings, and not the management’s meetings.  
Anybody who approaches a stockholder and asks him for his 
proxy, must recognize that he is asking the stockholder to 
appoint him as the stockholder’s agent.  He should give the 
stockholder accurate information and must recognize his 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Hearings, supra note 70, at 159. 
 76. Nicholas, supra note 67, at 128–30. 
 77. Id. at 130. 
 78. Id. at 129. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 128–32. 
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rights as the owner of the corporation.82
There was little public pressure to enact the rule, but the SEC 
staff persisted.  Their interest in shareholder democracy mirrored 
what Morton Horwitz has labeled “the emergence of democracy as a 
basic concept in American constitutional law” during the early 
1940s.83  Horwitz traces this phenomenon to the personal and 
professional impact that the barbarities of totalitarianism in Europe 
had on American social scientists.  Having devoted the early decades 
of the twentieth century to challenging absolutist theories in law, 
politics, and morals, these social scientists were left to wonder why 
America had been spared the ravages of European dictatorship.  
Political and legal theorists beginning in the late 1930s thus 
struggled to explain the contrast between democratic and non-
democratic societies.  As Horwitz notes, “This new obsession with 
democratic theory was designed to show how America had managed 
to avoid succumbing to European totalitarianism.”84  Whether 
deliberately or not, the SEC staff found a role for American 
corporations in this new collective narrative.85
The New Dealers wanted to recreate the traditional annual 
meeting, reminiscent of the democratic town meeting.  They 
wanted to create a solid corporate foundation for the ideal of 
American democracy.  Interestingly, when members of Congress 
raised questions about shareholder proposals supporting 
communism during the hearings concerning the rules, Purcell 
made clear that such proposals were outside the scope of the rule.86  
Frank Emerson and Franklin Latcham, avid 1950s advocates of 
shareholder democracy, beautifully captured the New Dealers’ 
aspirations when they wrote: 
[S]hareholder democracy holds promise of rekindling on a 
broader basis the spirit of individual inquiry and free discussion 
through use of the SEC provisions for security holder 
 82. Hearings, supra note 70, at 183. 
 83. Morton Horwitz & Orlando do Campo, When and How the Supreme 
Court Found Democracy—A Computer Study, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 28 
(1994). 
 84. Id.  On the emergence of democracy as a fundamental constitutional 
principle during the war years, see also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973);  
Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Foreword: The 
Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality without Fundamentalism, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 30, 58–65 (1993). 
 85. For a judicial endorsement of the relationship between corporations and 
American democracy, see A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (N.J. 
1953) (noting the contributions of corporations to the national welfare and 
success during World War I, the Depression, and World War II, and stressing 
that corporations could help sustain American democracy during the Cold War 
by making contributions to academic institutions). 
 86. Hearings, supra note 70, at 163. 
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communication and proposals for corporate action.  This, too, is 
salut[a]ry in that it affords a haven for human growth in an 
awesome atomic age.87
The shareholder proposal rule became effective January 15, 
1943.88  In 1945, after recounting the mid-1920s attempts to 
empower shareholders, a commentator noted that with the 
enactment of the shareholder proposal rule, shareholder 
organization, while still theoretical, had become at least possible.89
Still, as much as the New Dealers wanted to enact the 
shareholder proposal rule, their ideal of shareholder democracy 
was also meant to substantiate the absolute power of management 
to run the corporation.90  Subsequent developments brought that 
aspect to the fore.  Beginning shortly after its adoption and 
continuing well into the 1980s, the shareholder proposal rule, 
especially the definition of proper subjects and the qualifications of 
the submitting shareholders, underwent cycles of interpretation and 
amendments by the SEC and the courts.  These changes 
corresponded to, and helped shape, changing visions of the 
relationship among shareholders, executives, and directors in the 
large public corporation.  Ultimately they destroyed any possibility 
of effective shareholder participation. 
The first set of changes, adopted in 1947, simply formalized the 
role of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance in reviewing 
shareholder proposals that corporations wanted to omit from their 
proxy statements.91  A year later the SEC made additional changes, 
allowing corporations to omit proposals addressing proper subjects 
in three situations.  First, corporations could omit proposals that 
were submitted primarily to enforce a personal claim or redress a 
personal grievance against the company or its management.  
Second, they could omit proposals if management had included a 
proposal from the security holder in a proxy solicitation related to 
the last two annual meetings and the security holder failed to attend 
the meeting or to present the proposal for action at the meeting.  
Finally, corporations could omit proposals if substantially the same 
proposal had been voted on at the last meeting and received less 
 87. FRANK D. EMERSON & FRANKLIN C. LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: 
A BROADER OUTLOOK FOR CORPORATIONS 9–10 (1954). 
 88. George D. Hornstein, A New Forum for Stockholders, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 
35, 48 (1945). 
 89. Id.  On the shareholder proposal rule, see generally Daniel E. Lazaroff, 
Promoting Corporate Democracy and Social Responsibility: The Need to Reform 
the Federal Proxy Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 33 
(1997). 
 90. Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1512–13. 
 91. EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 87, at 94.  Before these amendments 
were adopted, the Third Circuit established the SEC’s authority to determine 
which shareholder proposals were “proper subjects.”  SEC v. Transamerica 
Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947). 
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than three percent of the vote.92  In 1952, the SEC went further, 
codifying its own practice of excluding from the scope of permissible 
shareholder proposals those “designed primarily to promote general 
economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes.”93  Two 
years later, the SEC excluded proposals referring to ordinary 
business from the appropriate scope of shareholders action.94  
Corporations could omit both those proposals having to do with too 
general (economic, political, racial, religious, social) a matter and 
those dealing with too narrow an issue, that is, ordinary business.95
The 1954 amendments left little of the original shareholder 
proposal rule.  The only power that shareholders still had, other 
than selling their stock, was the typically impractical power to 
launch a proxy contest.  Emerson went as far as to suggest that the 
1954 amendments encouraged proxy contests.96  (Proxy fights were 
so common in the 1950s, albeit typically unsuccessful, that an article 
in Barron’s National Business and Financial Weekly proclaimed 
1954 as “the year of battle by proxy.”97)  Instead of seeking to foster 
communication and cooperation between individual shareholders 
and managers, the 1954 amendments helped pave the way for a new 
vision of corporate democracy.  Reflecting, in part, the growing 
dominance of institutional investors, this vision was predicated 
upon the individual shareholder’s ability to self-protect by 
diversifying her portfolio.  The idea that shareholders were merely 
investors, as distinguished from participants, prevailed.98  By the 
1990s, this market-centered vision would dominate corporate law.  
As I elaborate below, it was substantiated by developments in state 
corporate law which solidified the directors’ role in supervising their 
corporations’ affairs (and that of the executives in managing them). 
The role and status of the board of directors have always been a 
contested issue.  In the nineteenth century directors were described 
as both agents and trustees.99  Yet courts and commentators agreed 
that while the directors’ role was similar to that of agents and 
 92. EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 87, at 94–95.  On these amendments, 
see also John G. Ledes, A Review of Proper Subject Under the Proxy Rules, 34 
U. DET. L.J. 520, 522–23 (1957); Nicholas, supra note 67, at 170–73. 
 93. EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 87, at 96. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 678–79 (D.C. Cir. 
1970). 
 96. Frank D. Emerson, Some Sociological and Legal Aspects of Institutional 
and Individual Participation Under the SEC’s Shareholder Proposal Rule, 34 U. 
DET. L.J. 528, 547 (1957). 
 97. John C. Perham, Revolt of the Stockholder: Proxy Fights Are Breaking 
Out Everywhere These Days, BARRON’S NAT’L BUS. & FIN. WKLY., Apr. 26, 1954, 
at 3. 
 98. On these two visions of the shareholders in the history of American 
corporate law, see Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 10. 
 99. Seymour D. Thompson, Liability of Directors of Corporations, 6 S. L. 
REV. 386, 387 (1880). 
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trustees, these labels were not entirely accurate when applied to 
directors.100  In the early decades of the twentieth century, as my 
discussion above indicates, Progressive corporate law scholars 
converged on viewing corporate power as power in trust and 
directors as trustees for the corporation and the community.101  But 
the trusteeship idea was never fully endorsed by the courts.  
Instead, courts preferred to view the directors’ role as analogous to 
the position of elected officials in a representative democracy.  
Accordingly, “[s]tockholders are supposed to elect directors who are 
responsible for the general conduct of the enterprise,” while “[t]he 
directors’ task is to choose managers whose business is to execute 
the general policies laid down by the directors to whom they are 
primarily responsible for the general conduct of the enterprise.”102
The idea that corporate democracy was a representative 
democracy became prominent beginning in the mid-1930s.  By the 
early 1940s, as more shareholders attempted to use the derivative 
suit to challenge directors’ actions and perhaps also as a backlash 
against the ideal of shareholder democracy, courts (with New York 
courts at the helm) drew on the ideal of representative democracy to 
limit the shareholders’ ability to challenge directors’ actions.103  
Their tool was an exemption from liability for honest mistakes, that 
is, mistakes that even a prudent person might make, from which 
directors benefited throughout the nineteenth century.104  
 100. Marcia M. McMurray, Note, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of 
Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 
605, 605–06 & nn.3–4 (1987). 
 101. For a detailed discussion of these developments, see Dalia Tsuk 
Mitchell, Status Bound: The Twentieth-Century Evolution of Directors’ Liability, 
5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 63, 81–102 (2009). 
 102. Thomas F. Woodlock, Careless Owners: How Shall the Supreme Inertia 
of the American Stockholder Be Overcome, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1931, at 1. 
 103. On the history of derivative suits (specifically in New York), see 
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Gentleman’s Agreement: The Antisemitic Origins of 
Restrictions on Stockholder Litigation (George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 44, 2002), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=321680. 
 104. Perhaps the earliest articulation of this exemption was found in Percy 
v. Millaudon, 8 MART. (n.s.) 68, 77–78 (La. 1829) (“[T]he adoption of a course 
from which loss ensues cannot make the [director] responsible, if the error was 
one into which a prudent man might have fallen. . . .  The test of responsibility 
therefore should be, not the certainty of wisdom in others, but the possession of 
ordinary knowledge; and by sh[o]wing that the error of the [director] is of so 
gross a kind, that a man of common sense, and ordinary attention, would not 
have fallen into it.”).  See also Godbold v. Branch Bank at Mobile, 11 Ala. 191, 
199 (1847) (explaining that directors do not “undertake, that they possess such 
a perfect knowledge of the matters and subjects which may come under their 
cognizance, that they cannot err, or be mistaken, either in the wisdom or 
legality of the means employed by them”); Hodges v. New Eng. Screw Co., 3 R.I. 
9, 18 (1853) (opining that “a Board of Directors acting in good faith and with 
reasonable care and diligence, who nevertheless fall into a mistake, either as to 
law or fact, are not liable for the consequences of such mistake”); S. Samuel 
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Expanding the scope of this exemption to encompass any and all 
directors’ mistakes, courts created the modern business judgment 
rule as a rule of deference to directors’ expert opinion.  Directors 
were regarded as “a kind of group of Platonic guardians whose right 
to rule was a legislative mandate.”105  Shareholders were banned 
from giving “orders to the directors, or act[ing] for the corporation, 
unless by unanimous vote or agreement,”106 and, for the most part, 
prevented from challenging directors’ decisions that harmed the 
corporation.107
Specifically, in the absence of fraud, conflict of interest, or bad 
faith, courts refrained from evaluating directors’ actions in matters 
entrusted to their discretion even when the directors’ errors were 
gross.  Take as one example Everett v. Phillips, a suit by a minority 
shareholder of Empire Power Corporation to compel directors sitting 
both on its board and on the board of Long Island Lighting Company 
to demand payment of indebtedness from the lighting company to 
the power company.108  In determining that the directors did not 
violate their trust to the power company or its shareholders, the 
Court of Appeals of New York noted that not merely innocent (or 
honest) mistakes but also gross mistakes were protected from ex-
post intervention by the courts.109  As Chief Judge Lehman put it: 
[H]owever high may be the standard of fidelity to duty which 
the court may exact, errors of judgment by directors do not 
alone suffice to demonstrate lack of fidelity.  That is true even 
though the errors may be so gross that they may demonstrate 
the unfitness of the directors to manage the corporate 
affairs.110
In the end, exemptions to directors’ liability encroached upon 
the standard of care applicable to their actions.111  As the following 
Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 100 (1979) 
(noting that “the principal genesis of the business judgment rule [was] human 
fallibility”). 
 105. Robert A. Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A 
Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 696, 697 (1960). 
 106. Id. at 700. 
 107. For a detailed examination of the emergence of the modern business 
judgment rule, see Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 101, at 113–23. 
 108. Everett v. Phillips, 43 N.E.2d 18, 19 (N.Y. 1942). 
 109. Id. at 19–20. 
 110. Id.  While Everett involved a duty of loyalty claim, the statement quoted 
above also applied to duty of care situations.  Id.; see also Rous v. Carlisle, 26 
N.Y.S.2d 197, 200 (App. Div. 1941) (“If a director exercises his business 
judgment in good faith on the information before him, he may not be called to 
account through the judicial process, even though he may have erred in his 
judgment.  It is  necessary, therefore, for the stockholder to allege facts showing 
more than error in business judgment.”). 
 111. While my argument in this Article focuses on the duty of care, it is 
important to note that, at the same time, courts also substituted a concept of 
fairness for traditional notions of trust as the foundation of the duty of loyalty.  
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part explores, in the second half of the twentieth century, concerns 
about corporate power and hierarchies dissipated as new ideology 
came to dominate corporate law.  Resting on the assumption that 
the corporation was a nexus of private, contractual relationships, 
this new ideology cleared the way for presumably egalitarian 
economic markets to become the relevant focal point for corporate 
law doctrine.112  Directors and executives were not only empowered 
to manage the corporation without interference from the 
shareholders (or the community), they were also shielded from 
liability. 
III.  LEGITIMACY 
One of the striking characteristics of early-twentieth century 
writings about corporate law was the absence of theoretical 
economics.  Progressive thought was informed by a managerialist 
economic theory that justified “widespread, state-enforced wealth 
distribution and intervention in the market.”113  In turn, the 
mainstream of economic thought beginning in the 1910s was 
“increasingly skeptical, indifferent and eventually hostile toward 
concepts of social value—or to any concept of value that could not be 
defined strictly in terms of individual preference,”114 and thus 
“increasingly strict and pessimistic about the science of measuring 
welfare.”115  The result was a sharp separation of law and economics 
in American thought from the 1930s through the 1960s.  
Mainstream economists developed “the neoclassical theory of 
competition” while legal scholars continued to rely on regulatory 
agencies to allocate resources.116
By the 1970s, however, neoclassical economists shifted their 
attention from markets to theorizing about the corporation’s 
internal structures.  Their new theory of the firm offered a picture of 
the corporation that fit the market-centered economic policies of the 
postwar years.  Rather than putting management hierarchies and 
Trust required directors and executives to work in their corporation’s best 
interests and prohibited them from considering their interests while dealing 
with matters within the scope of their fiduciary obligations.  In turn, fairness, a 
concept of balance and proportionality, allowed directors and managers to take 
their own interests into account in their examination of self-dealing 
transactions.  Within a few decades, the courts’ fairness test became fixated on 
process rather than substance.  By the end of the twentieth century, the 
circumstances in which a fiduciary could be found to violate this fairness 
standard were relatively few.  See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in 
Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425 (1993). 
 112. William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical 
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 416–20 (1989). 
 113. Herbert Hovenkamp, Knowledge About Welfare: Legal Realism and the 
Separation of Law and Economics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 805, 810 (2000). 
 114. Id. at 836. 
 115. Id. at 810. 
 116. Id. at 811. 
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the need to constrain corporate power at the center of the corporate 
paradigm, the new economic theory of the firm found a way around 
hierarchy and regulation by drawing on microeconomics to describe 
corporate entities as nexuses of private, contractual relationships 
and to paint a new picture of the firm and economic markets in 
which “hierarchy is irrelevant.”117  The corporation was merely a 
collection of “disaggregated . . . transactions” among individuals (or 
between them and the fictive entity, “as a matter of convenience”).118
The new theory of the firm supported a shift of focus in 
scholarly debates from questions of power, influence, sanctions, and 
legitimacy to issues of cost reduction and profit maximization.119  Its 
proponents reframed the problems of corporate power and 
hierarchies as the problem of the separation of ownership from 
control (or agency costs) and sought to demonstrate how capital 
markets could eliminate the concerns about efficiency associated 
with this separation.120  The individual shareholder’s ability freely to 
act in economic markets (that is, to sell her stock), supplemented 
only by her right to elect her directors, now described as her agents, 
was the cornerstone of their theory of corporate governance.  Power 
and hierarchy disappeared, and the individual shareholder gained the 
ability to self-protect, mostly by selling her interest in the corporation.  
The market eclipsed both shareholder participation and fiduciary 
obligations as a means of taming corporate power or the control 
group. 
For one thing, in 1983, the SEC changed the rule allowing 
omission of proposals that were not significantly related to the 
issuer’s business.121  It defined “not significantly related” as 
accounting for “less than 5 percent of the issuer’s total assets . . .  
and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross sales for its 
most recent fiscal year.”122  In fact, the SEC was so obsessed with 
economic markets that in the course of preparing the amendments it 
went as far as to challenge the necessity of “a federal regulatory 
scheme protecting shareholder[] proposals.”123
 117. Bratton, supra note 112, at 417. 
 118. Id. at 416–20. 
 119. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical 
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1498 (1989). 
 120. Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism, supra note 19, at 212–15. 
 121. Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 34-20091, 
48 Fed. Reg. 38,218 (Aug. 23, 1983) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 122. Id. at 38,223. 
 123. Virginia J. Harnisch, Comment, Rule 14a-8 After Reagan: Does It 
Protect Social Responsibility Shareholder Proposals?, 6 J.L. & POL. 415, 433–34 
(1990).  The 1983 amendments also required a proponent of a shareholder 
proposal to own “at least one percent or $1,000, whichever is less, of securities 
eligible to be voted at the meeting.”  Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional 
Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 115 (1988).  
The proponent had to “have owned those securities for at least one year prior to 
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No longer concerned about the role of the individual shareholder 
and her ability to influence her corporation’s policies (including 
social policy), the SEC seemed to have embraced the idea that 
shareholders would prefer to sell their stock than to participate in 
corporate affairs.  The vision of the shareholder as fixated on 
corporate profits, specifically short-term profits, became its motto.124
The structure of ownership in most large corporations 
substantiated this vision.  By the 1980s, most U.S. firms had large 
shareholders, typically institutional investors or the initial owners 
(and their families).125  Many scholars came to accept that the 
individual shareholder would remain rationally apathetic and 
passive126 but trusted these large shareholders to take a more active 
role in monitoring corporate management.  Institutional investors 
seemed more prone to communicate with managers, engage in proxy 
contests (or threaten them),127 and submit shareholder proposals.128  
the meeting, and continue to own them through the day on which the meeting is 
held.”  Id.  Moreover, the new amendments restricted all shareholders “to one 
14a-8 proposal per meeting.”  Id.  Finally, the new amendments made it 
sufficiently more difficult for the shareholder to gain access to the proxy 
machine by changing the “voting percentages for resubmission [of proposals] 
from three percent to five percent for the first resubmission, and from six to 
eight percent for the second.”  Harnisch, supra, at 439. 
 124. In the year following the 1983 amendments, “[f]orty-two percent fewer 
proposals were recorded.”  Harnisch, supra note 123, at 440.  The numbers 
rebounded by 1987.  Nicholas, supra note 67, at 387–88.  Yet while social 
purpose proposals (addressing plant closing, environmental protection, 
apartheid, or employment discrimination) continued to be submitted, corporate 
governance issues captured the attention of shareholders, especially 
institutional investors.  For analyses of trends in shareholder proposals, see 
Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit 
Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 883–84 (1994); Randall S. Thomas & James F. 
Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium: Shareholder Support, 
Board Response, and Market Reaction, Vanderbilt Law & Econ. Research Paper 
No. 05-30, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=868652; Tsuk Mitchell, supra 
note 10, at 1569–73. 
 125. Gerald F. Davis & Tracy A. Thompson, A Social Movement Perspective 
on Corporate Control, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 141, 154 (1994); Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 
461 (1986).  Shleifer and Vishny note that in “a sample of 456 of the Fortune 
500 firms, 354 have at least one shareholder owning at least 5 percent of the 
firm. . . .  The average holding of the largest shareholder among the 456 firms is 
15.4 percent.”  Id. at 462.  They further note that a large number of these 
shareholders are “families represented on boards of directors (149 
cases) . . . pension and profit-sharing plans (90 cases) . . . financial firms such as 
banks, insurance companies, or investment funds (117 cases) . . . [and] firms 
and family holding companies with large stakes who do not have board seats 
(100 cases).”  Id. 
 126. See J.A.C. Hetherington, When the Sleeper Wakes: Reflections on 
Corporate Governance and Shareholder Rights, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183, 184–86 
(1979). 
 127. See generally David A. Butz, How Do Large Minority Shareholders 
Wield Control?, 15 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 291 (1994). 
 128. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer & Joseph Zechner, Large 
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Although such expectations were not fulfilled—most institutional 
investors turned out to be less interested in spending money and 
effort on monitoring management129—institutional investors such as 
public pension funds and labor organizations helped shift the focus 
of debates from social issues to corporate governance, specifically 
management’s anti-takeover tactics or compensation packages.130
In such an atmosphere, corporate democracy became strictly 
representative democracy; the rhetoric of shareholder democracy 
was rapidly associated not with shareholder participation but with 
the investors’ twin rights of voice and exit.131  But, as I conclude 
below, in the last decades of the twentieth century, the Delaware 
courts did their best to render even this limited set of rights 
ineffective, to solidify management’s absolute power, and to shield it 
from liability. 
First, as to the shareholders’ right to exit, the Delaware courts 
refused to legitimate the market for control as a means of 
constraining directors and executives.  In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., the seminal takeover case, the Delaware Supreme 
Court drew upon the board’s “fundamental duty and obligation to 
protect the corporate enterprise” to create the power of the board to 
adopt defensive tactics that would thwart hostile takeovers (and the 
market for control).132  Shareholders’ exit rights, in short, were 
Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium, 102 J. 
POL. ECON. 1097, 1097–98 (1994) (arguing that institutional investors had 
become more active).  But see John M. Bizjak & Christopher J. Marquette, Are 
Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder 
Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills, 33 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 499, 
500 (1998) (concluding that, contrary to other studies of shareholder activism, 
their findings did not suggest that individual shareholder proposals received 
less support than proposals submitted by institutional investors). 
 129. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder 
Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 629–30 (2006) (noting that although 
institutional investors could have had an active role in corporate governance, by 
the late 1990s most did not make efforts to monitor management, conduct proxy 
solicitations, put forward shareholder proposals, seek to elect representatives 
on the boards, or coordinate their activities). 
 130. Nicholas, supra note 67, at 429, 456.  The most recent campaign to 
allow shareholders to nominate directors via company proxy materials, 
including a proposed rule by the SEC (Facilitating Shareholder Director 
Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9046, Exchange Act Release No. 
60,089, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,765, 74 Fed. Reg. 29024 
(proposed June 10, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, 
274)), illustrates the prevalence of corporate governance issues as the focus of 
shareholder proposals, and shareholder democracy more broadly, at the turn of 
the twenty first century. 
 131. On the relevance of exit and voice to organizations and political 
governments, see generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: 
RESPONSES TO DECLINES IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
 132. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).  
The court enumerated several provisions of the Delaware General Corporations 
Law as sources for the board’s power, but none of these provisions was explicitly 
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hollow. 
The right to vote did not fare better.  While the Delaware courts 
stressed that directors could not impede the shareholders’ vote, the 
shareholders’ right to vote remained what it had been throughout 
the twentieth century—“a vestige or ritual of little practical 
importance.”133  Chancellor Allen’s decision in Blasius Industries, 
Inc. v. Atlas Corp. illustrates this point. Blasius involved a conflict 
between Atlas’s board and Atlas’s largest shareholder, Blasius.  In 
an attempt to prevent or at least delay Blasius from placing a 
majority of new directors on the board, Atlas’s board increased its 
size by two and filled the newly created directorships.134  Allen 
began by stressing that corporate law “does not create Platonic 
masters.”135  Rather, the shareholders, as principals, could view 
issues differently than did the board, and “[i]f they do, or did, they 
are entitled to employ the mechanisms provided by the corporation 
law and the . . . certificate of incorporation” to promote their 
views.136  Moreover, the shareholders were entitled “to restrain their 
agents, the board, from acting for the principal purpose of thwarting 
that action.”137
One would be mistaken to assume, however, that Allen (or the 
Delaware courts) fully embraced the idea that directors were agents 
of the shareholders.  If such were the case, directors would not be 
able to act without the explicit or, at least, implied consent of their 
principals.  But, while Allen would not allow directors to affect the 
shareholders’ ability to elect their agents, he was fully content to 
permit directors to prevent shareholders from selling their stock to a 
hostile bidder.138  Indeed, the issue was one of legitimacy.  Allen 
used agency theory to legitimate the status of directors as, 
ironically, Platonic masters.  As he put it, “The shareholder 
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy 
meant to address takeovers. 
 133. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 134. Id. at 652–53. 
 135. Id. at 663. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See, for example, Allen’s decision in Paramount Communications, Inc. 
v. Time, Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at *89–90 
(July 14, 1989) (“The corporation law does not operate on the theory that 
directors, in exercising their powers to manage the firm, are obligated to follow 
the wishes of a majority of shares.  In fact, directors, not shareholders, are 
charged with the duty to manage the firm. . . .  That many, presumably  most, 
shareholders would prefer the board to do otherwise than it has done does not, 
in the circumstances of a challenge to this type of transaction, in my opinion, 
afford a basis to interfere with the effectuation of the board’s business 
judgment.”).  See also Robert B. Thompson, Shareholders as Grown-Ups: Voting, 
Selling, and Limits on the Board’s Power to “Just Say No,” 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 
999, 1011–14 (1999) (noting the apparent inconsistencies between the Delaware 
courts’ disempowerment of shareholders in the hostile takeover cases and their 
approach in cases such as Blasius). 
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of directorial power rests.”139  No longer a means of shareholder 
participation (or empowerment), shareholders’ voting rights became 
a means of legitimating management’s exercise of power.  As Allen 
noted, “whether the vote [was] seen functionally as an unimportant 
formalism, or as an important tool of discipline, it . . . legitimate[d] 
the exercise of power by some (directors and officers) over vast 
aggregations of property that they [did] not own.”140
The Delaware courts did more than solidify and legitimate 
management’s power.  They also shielded directors and executives 
from liability.  First, embracing the growing numbers of 
independent directors serving on boards (independence narrowly 
defined as lack of control or domination by an individual interested 
in the transaction),141 the Delaware courts declared that if a 
majority of independent, disinterested directors approved the 
board’s actions (including conflict of interest transactions and 
adoption of anti-takeover tactics), such actions would be shielded 
from further judicial inquiry.142  Second, the Delaware courts 
collapsed the duty of care into the business judgment rule and 
proclaimed that to invoke the rule’s protection, directors had a duty 
merely to inform themselves prior to making a business decision of 
all material information reasonably available to them.143  Without 
 139. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988).  For an insightful 
analysis of “independence” under Delaware law, see Usha Rodrigues, The 
Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447 (2008).  See also Alan R. 
Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director’s Duty of 
Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351 (1989) (advocating a director’s separate duty 
of independence). 
 142. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) 
(noting that when directors adopt a defensive tactic, their ability to fulfill their 
Unocal duties is “materially enhanced . . . where . . . a majority of the board 
favoring the proposal consisted of outside independent directors who have acted 
in accordance with the foregoing standards”); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 n.3 (Del. 1986) (noting that “certain 
presumptions . . . generally attach to the decisions of a board whose majority 
consists of truly outside independent directors”); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990) (noting that the evidence supporting 
the conclusion that in making its decision the Time’s board was not uninformed 
“is materially enhanced by the fact that twelve of Time’s sixteen board members 
were outside independent directors.”).  On the liability shielding power of 
independent directors, see Mitchell, supra note 40, at 57–60; Tsuk Mitchell, 
supra note 101, at 138–40. 
 143. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Lyman Johnson, The 
Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625, 640–42 (2000).  According 
to the traditional formulation of the business judgment rule, directors were 
presumed to act “in good faith, in the exercise of their best judgment, and for 
what they believed to be the advantage of the corporation and all its 
stockholders.”  Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 140 A. 264, 268 (Del. 1927).  As 
Johnson argues, Aronson changed the rule into a “presumption that in making 
a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in 
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precedent to support its holding, the Delaware Supreme Court 
further announced that “under the business judgment rule director 
liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”144  Unless a 
plaintiff arguing a breach of the duty of care demonstrated that the 
directors were grossly negligent (that is, grossly negligent with 
respect to the requirement to be informed), the directors would have 
the presumption of the business judgment rule and the court would 
not second-guess their actions.145  In short, as long as directors, 
insiders and outsiders alike, followed the scripts that the Delaware 
courts had provided them throughout the 1980s, the Delaware 
courts would not reevaluate their decisions.  If up to the 1980s 
directors might have been held liable for breaches of their fiduciary 
obligations (although they seldom were),146 by the end of the decade 
such possibility was nonexistent.  In corporate law at the turn of the 
twenty-first century, managerial power is absolute power. 
EPILOGUE 
In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation offered the 
Delaware courts a unique opportunity to reevaluate the twentieth-
century legitimization of corporate power and erosion of directors’ 
duties and liabilities.147  The question in the case was whether 
Disney’s board of directors breached their duties by hiring Michael 
Ovitz as president and firing him fourteen months later with a 
severance package of roughly $130 million.148  Early in the litigation, 
the court dismissed the duty of loyalty claims.  At the same time, 
Disney’s charter exempted directors from liability for breaches of the 
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company.”  Johnson, supra, at 640. 
 144. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also Johnson, supra note 143, at 643 n.81 
(noting that this sentence captured “Aronson’s functional conflating of the duty 
of due care and the business judgment rule”).  For a detailed analysis of these 
developments, see Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 101, at 140–49. 
 145. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).  Interestingly, 
what “gross negligence” meant remained an open question.  Rabkin v. Philip A. 
Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 970 (Del. Ch. 1986).  For the endorsement of 
similar language in other jurisdictions, see DENNIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON 
& STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF 
CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 9–19 (2d ed. 1988). 
 146. Before the 1980s, only in “a handful of cases outside the context of 
financial institutions . . . directors of business corporations had been found 
liable for breach of their duty of care.”  Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care 
Component of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 
978 (1994).  For the most part, commentators agree that “the business judgment 
rule has historically proved to be ‘a very potent defense for corporate directors 
and officers against claims primarily asserted by shareholders for loss resulting 
from decisions that went awry.’”  Id. at 980. 
 147. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 
2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (references below are to the decision of the 
Court of Chancery).  
 148. Id. at 697. 
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duty of care (pursuant to section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law).149  The only means of imposing liability on 
Disney’s board of directors was resurrecting a separate good faith 
standard.  Chancellor Chandler was skillful in crafting such a 
standard, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed.  According to 
Disney, a director might fail to act in good faith if he or she 
“intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the 
best interests of the corporation,” “acts with the intent to violate 
applicable positive law,” or “intentionally fails to act in the face of a 
known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his 
duties.”150  The latter possibility was particularly pertinent in 
Disney.  Yet, following their own traditions, Chancellor Chandler 
and the Delaware Supreme Court determined that the Disney 
directors acted in good faith.151  As Chandler apologetically 
explained, “This court strongly encourages directors and officers to 
employ best practices, as those practices are understood at the time 
a corporate decision is taken.  But Delaware law does not—indeed, 
the common law cannot—hold fiduciaries liable for a failure to 
comply with the aspirational ideal of best practices . . . .”152
Having helped to eradicate any meaningful force out of 
corporate law, all that the Delaware courts have left to elaborate at 
the turn of the twenty-first century are ideals they are unwilling to 
enforce. 
 
 149. Id. at 751–53. 
 150. Id. at 755. 
 151. Id. at 760–79.  It is important to add that developments past Disney 
have undermined the potential force of its good faith analysis.  In Stone ex rel. 
AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), the Delaware 
Supreme Court assessed “whether a violation of the duty to act in good faith is a 
basis for the direct imposition of liability.”  Id. at 369 n.29.  The Court 
concluded that only the duty of care and duty of loyalty, “where violated, may 
directly result in liability, whereas a failure to act in good faith may do so, but 
indirectly.”  Id. at 370.  Failure to act in good faith was subsumed under the 
duty of loyalty. 
 152. In re Walt Disney, 907 A.2d at 697. 
